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Electricity markets are complex environments, involving numerous en- tities trying to obtain the best 
advantages and profits while limited by power-network characteristics and constraints.1 The 
restructuring and conse- quent deregulation of electricity markets introduced a new economic dimension 
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to the power industry. Some observers have 
criticized the restructuring process, how- 
ever, because it has failed to improve market 
efficiency and has complicated the assurance 
of reliability and fairness of  operations. 
To study and understand this type of mar- 
ket, we developed the Multiagent Simulator of 
Competitive Electricity Markets (MASCEM) 
platform based on multiagent  simulation. 
The MASCEM multiagent model includes 
players with strategies for bid definition, 
acting in forward, day-ahead, and balancing 
markets and considering both simple and 
complex bids. Our goal with MASCEM was 
to simulate as many market models and 
player types as possible. This approach makes 
MASCEM both  a  short-  and  medium- 
term simulation as well as a tool to support 
long-term decisions, such as those taken by 
regulators. 
This article proposes a new methodology 
integrated in MASCEM for bid definition in 
electricity markets. This methodology uses 
reinforcement learning algorithms to let 
players perceive changes in the environment, 
thus helping them react to the dynamic en- 
vironment and adapt their bids  accordingly. 
Electricity Markets 
The electricity market environment typi- 
cally consists of a pool that players submit 
their bids to, which can be symmetric or 
asymmetric, and a floor for bilateral con- 
tracts. Additionally, some countries also 
include a balancing market, in which each 
market player must decide whether to, and 
how to, participate in each market   type. 
Besides the electricity sellers and buyers 
that negotiate in the market, these markets 
usually also include a market operator and a 
system operator. The market operator is re- 
sponsible for regulating the market; it man- 
ages the pool using a market-clearing tool to 
set market price and a set of accepted selling 
and buying bids for every negotiation pe- 
riod. The system operator is usually respon- 
sible for managing the transmission grid and 
all the involved technical constraints. Every 
established contract, either through bilateral 
contracts or the pool, must be communi- 
cated to the system operator, who analyzes 
their technical feasibility from the point of 
view of the power system. 
Players negotiating on the pool must prepare 
a  bid  for  the  24  periods  of  the  spot market. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
These bids are subjected to 
complex conditions, includ- 
ing both technical and eco- 
nomic constraints, such as 
 
• the load gradient that 
refers to the ramping up 
and down of plants; 
• indivisibility, wherein a 
generation facility only 
agrees to be dispatched 
if its offer is completely 
accepted; and 
• minimum income, 
wherein a block bid will 
not be accepted by the 
matching algorithm if 
the minimum income 
requested by the partic- 
ipant is not fulfilled. 
 
The market operator 
must  assure  that  the eco- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Negotiation sequence for one day in electricity markets. 
Market negotiations on the pool and through bilateral contracts 
can evolve simultaneously. The pool mechanism might be 
symmetrical or asymmetrical and include complex conditions. 
Considering these complex conditions is essential for the 
balancing market. 
with bidding strategies, 
which must be adequate 
and refined to let them 
gain the highest possible 
advantage from each mar- 
ket context. 
 
MASCEM Overview 
MASCEM includes a 
complex simulation in- 
frastructure that can 
cope with the diverse 
time scales of the sup- 
ported negotiation mech- 
anisms and with several 
agents competing and 
cooperating with each 
other. Figure 2 illustrates 
MASCEM’s most impor- 
tant features.2 
Unlike traditional tools, 
MASCEM does not pos- 
tulate   a   single    decision 
nomical dispatch accounts for the spec- 
ified conditions, which might imply 
removing entities that have presented 
competitive bids but whose complex 
conditions were not satisfied. Com- 
plex conditions instigate the develop- 
ment of new kinds of player strategies 
for bid definition. 
The balancing market’s goal is to 
take care of the necessary adjust- 
ments on the  viable  daily program 
and the last final hourly program, 
correcting possible deviations from 
forecasted production or consump- 
tion. It is, therefore, a complementary 
platform to the day-ahead  market. 
Although only sellers can present 
complex conditions to the spot mar- 
ket, in the balancing market, both 
sellers and buyers may present com- 
plex conditions. 
Another important issue is that 
sellers may become buyers and buyers 
may become sellers on the balancing 
market. That is also a new subject to 
be explored by market players when 
defining strategies for bid definition. 
Figure 1 presents the common ne- 
gotiation sequence for one day in 
electricity markets. 
The need for understanding these 
mechanisms and how the involved 
players’ interactions affects the out- 
comes of the markets has contrib- 
uted to the increased use of simula- 
tion tools in order to determine the 
best possible results in each market 
context for each participating entity. 
Multiagent-based software is particu- 
larly well fitted to analyzing dynamic 
and  adaptive  systems  with   com- 
plex interactions among their con- 
stituents. Several of such modeling 
tools—designed to help researchers 
study restructured wholesale power 
markets—have emerged. In addition 
to MASCEM,2 other relevant tools in 
this domain  are  AMES,3  EMCAS,4 
and   MASI.5 
We implement players in MASCEM 
as independent agents, with  their 
own ability to perceive the states and 
changes in the world and to act ac- 
cordingly.  These  agents  are provided 
maker  with  a  single  objective   for 
the entire system6. Rather, we allow 
agents representing the different in- 
dependent entities in electricity mar- 
kets to establish their own objectives 
and decision rules. Moreover, as the 
simulation progresses, agents can 
adapt their strategies based on the 
success or failure of previous efforts. 
In each situation, agents dynami- 
cally adapt their  strategies accord- 
ing to the present context and using 
the dynamically updated detained 
knowledge.2 
MASCEM’s key players reflect ac- 
tual entities from real markets and 
provide a means for aggregating con- 
sumers and producers. Presently, we 
have agents representing market- 
independent entities such as the sys- 
tem operator, which is another sim- 
ulator7 that gets the economical 
dispatch and undertakes power-flow 
analysis to assure economical agree- 
ments can be implemented without 
disturbing power-grid stability and 
technical constraints. 
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The market operator agent regu- 
lates pool negotiations. This agent 
analyzes bids presented to the pool 
and defines the market price and 
economical dispatch. It cooperates 
with the system operator  by  send- 
ing it the economical dispatch. The 
market operator agent uses different 
algorithms to account for complex 
conditions. 
The seller and buyer agents are the 
two key players in the market.  Sell- 
ers represent entities able to sell elec- 
tricity in the market—for example, 
companies holding electricity pro- 
duction units. Buyers represent elec- 
tricity consumers or even distribu- 
tion companies. Sellers compete with 
each other because each seller is inter- 
ested in maximizing its profits. They 
also cooperate with buyers while try- 
ing to establish a mutually profitable 
agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. MASCEM key features. The figure summarizes MASCEM’s most relevant 
characteristics such as the ability to simulate several types of negotiations found in 
electricity markets, consider algorithms for bids price definition and the inclusion of 
distributed generation. Also, important features such as power-flow analysis and 
scenarios definition based on real data are available. 
Virtual power player (VPP) agents 
represent a set of producers, mainly 
based on distributed generation and re- 
newable sources.8,9 They can provide 
the means to adequately support dis- 
tributed generation increasing  use 
and its participation in the context of 
competitive electricity markets. VPP 
agents are implemented as a coalition 
of agents, each one acting as an inde- 
pendent multiagent system. 
VPPs are responsible  for  manag- 
ing the coalition of producers, which 
includes negotiating  in  the electric- 
ity market on behalf of the coalition 
and negotiating internally with their 
members, to guarantee that the terms 
of each member’s  contract  are fair 
and suited to the VPP’s characteris- 
tics and objectives. For this process, 
we have developed a classification 
algorithm that analyzes each pro- 
ducer’s characteristics and tests their 
suitability to the VPP’s objectives.9 
This provides the VPP with knowl- 
edge about which producers are most 
likely  to  favorably  contribute  to  the 
VPP’s results, which lets it decide 
which producers to aggregate. 
MASCEM     is     implemented     on 
top  of  the  Open  Agent  Architecture 
(OAA, www.ai.sri.com/oaa) using the 
AgentLib   library,   Java   Virtual   Ma- 
chine  1.6.0,  and  LPA  Win-Prolog  In- 
telligence Server (www.lpa.co.uk). 
All the agents share the OAA’s In- 
teragent Communication Language, 
no matter which machine they run on 
or which programming language they 
are programmed in, which lets us in- 
tegrate the various software modules. 
This is a flexible framework, and its 
ability to develop agents in different 
programming languages is an advan- 
tage over other platforms. OAA is not 
a framework specifically devoted to 
develop simulations; we made some 
extensions to make it more suitable 
and to include, for example, time 
evolution. 
Figure  3  displays  a  screenshot  of 
a running buyer agent, showing its 
bids, its sold and unsold power, and 
the  requests  it  is  receiving.  The  top 
part of Figure 3 shows the graphical 
representation of this agent’s results 
in the pool. It includes the amount of 
energy that it bought in each period 
and compares its bid price to the mar- 
ket price. 
The bottom shows  the  requests 
that this agent is receiving at each 
time and some information about its 
actions. In this case, period 20 has 
ended and the agent is getting ready 
to start negotiations for period 21. 
First, we can see that it received a no- 
tification from the market operator 
indicating that the time for the pres- 
ent period of negotiations ended. So, 
the agent performs the necessary ar- 
rangements to be ready for the next 
period. The second line gives a sum- 
mary of this agent’s results from the 
last period. The third line  indicates 
the bid price and amount of power 
that this agent will negotiate in this 
market in the next period. The agent 
will use these output values in its bid- 
ding strategy in the next negotiation 
period. 
Key features 
Electricity markets 
• Bilateral contracts 
• Forward market 
• Day-ahead spot market 
- With/without complex conditions 
- Symmetric/asymmetric pool 
• Balancing market 
• Considering complex conditions 
Distributed generation 
• Inclusion of virtual power players 
(VPPs) 
• Classification mechanism to analyze 
producers’ contribution to the VPP 
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among the members 
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• Bid price 
• Data mining techniques 
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Other features 
- Power-flow verification 
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- Real market data usage in simulations 
- Database continuous update 
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Strategies   for  
Bid   Definition  
The first issue to 
consider when de- 
fining strategies for 
players’ action in 
electricity markets 
is to take advan- 
tage of the individ- 
ual characteristics 
that each particular 
market offers. Using 
data mining mech- 
anisms10,11 and 
machine-learning al- 
gorithms,12,13 we can 
predict the prices that 
are expected in each 
of these markets, 
given the required 
amounts  of  energy 
to  be  traded  and 
the costs that must 
be covered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Buyer agent’s output. The top shows the graphical representation 
of this agent’s results in the pool. The bottom shows the requests that this 
agent is receiving and some information about its actions. 
particular period of 
each day and for each 
market. That also de- 
pends on the amount 
of power available to 
trade. When a player 
tries   to    establish 
a bilateral contract, 
the deals are depen- 
dent on the amount 
of power that is be- 
ing negotiated. This 
prediction takes that 
into consideration 
by applying fuzzy 
logic on the absolute 
amount  of   power 
to classify it  in  one 
of the categories de- 
fined by a clustering 
mechanism, which 
groups the ranges of 
amounts that pres- 
ent similar prices in 
each market. 
Strategy   for   power   Definition  
Given the expected production of one 
player for each period of each day, 
the amount of power to be negoti- 
ated in each market is optimized to 
get the maximum profit that can be 
achieved. The inputs are 
 
• the weekday, d; 
The outputs are SpowM1, …, NumM, 
representing  the  amount  of  power 
to sell in each distinct market, and 
BpowS1, …, NumS, representing the 
amount of power to buy in each session 
of the balancing market. As Equation 1 
shows, 
We calculate the value function as 
follows: Value (day,  per,  Pow,  mar- 
ket) Data (fuzzy (Pow), day, per, 
market). This equation has constraints 
dependent on the individual char- 
acteristics and requirements of each 
particular market. Therefore, these 
constraints are formulated based on the 
set of markets and their characteristics 
 
• the number of days, Nday;  considered  for each run. We  must  also 
• the negotiation period, p; 
• the number of periods, Nper; 
• a Boolean variable for each distinct 
market or negotiation platform, 
  take into consideration the constraints 
 imposed by each player’s conditions. 
For  every  situation,  we  apply   the 
 
main constraint in Equation   2: 
AsellM1, …, NumM, indicating if this 
player can enter it to sell; 
   
 
 
 
 a Boolean variable for each ses-    
,  
  
sion    of    the    balancing  market, 
AbuyS1,  …,  NumS, indicating  if this 
   
player is allowed to buy in each of 
them; 
• the markets M1, M2, …, NumM; 
and 
• the balancing market sessions S1, 
S2, …, NumS. 
 
where psM,d,p is the expected selling 
price and pbS,d,p is the expected buy- 
ing price. 
The value function returns the ex- 
pected  value   of  the  power  for   each 
which ensures that the total power 
reserved to be sold in all markets is 
never higher than the total expected 
production (TEP) plus the power ex- 
pected to be bought along all balanc- 
ing market sessions. 
  
 
 
 
The optimization mechanism lets 
agents 
 
• negotiate with different players in 
the bilateral contracts, giving them 
the chance to get higher or lower 
prices, depending on the circum- 
stances, and 
• wait for the later balancing market 
sessions to provide higher amounts 
of energy if they expect the price to 
go up. 
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This mechanism also lets  sellers 
buy and buyers  sell  in  the  balanc- 
ing market so they can obtain better 
business opportunities. This is pos- 
sible in two ways. They can use ar- 
bitrage opportunities, buying extra 
energy when the prices are expected 
to be lower and then selling it later 
when the prices go up. On the other 
hand, if the prices show the opposite 
tendency, they can offer more   energy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Multiagent system for bidding strategies integration with MASCEM. This 
figure presents the three multiagent systems that are integrated in this simulator: 
MASCEM main system and markets operation, virtual power player (VPP) agent 
modeling, and the multiagent system for bidding strategies. It also includes the 
programming languages and design tools used for the implementation. 
than the player actually expects to 
produce to increase profit and then 
buy that difference in the expected 
lower-price opportunities. 
 
Strategy for price Definition 
For each market, we predict prices 
using statistical methods, data min- 
ing techniques,10,11 neural net- 
works,10,13 support vector machines 
(SVM), or several other meth- 
ods.12,14,15 No method is best  for 
every situation,  but  each  might be 
the best for one or more particular 
cases. 
To take advantage of the best char- 
acteristics of each technique, our 
method integrates several technolo- 
gies and approaches. We place the set 
of algorithms below the main rein- 
forcement learning algorithm, which 
means that in each moment and cir- 
cumstance the technique that pres- 
ents the best results for every scenario 
is chosen as the simulator’s response. 
So,  given  as  many  answers  to   each 
problem as there are algorithms, the 
reinforcement learning algorithm will 
choose the one that is most likely to 
present the best answer given their 
past responses and each situation’s 
present characteristics, such as the 
weekday,  period,  and  market  that 
the algorithms are being asked to 
forecast. 
We implement this method as a 
multiagent system itself. There is one 
agent per distinct algorithm,  with 
only the knowledge of how to per- 
form it. This way the system can in- 
crease performance by executing all 
the algorithms in parallel; each agent 
gets its answer at the same time and 
sends it to the main agent, which then 
chooses the most appropriate answer. 
Figure 4 illustrates this multiagent 
system for bidding strategies’ integra- 
tion with MASCEM, along with the 
design tools we used to build each 
component. 
The agents use several forecast 
algorithms  during  this  process.   The 
statistical approaches use these 
elements: 
 
• average market prices of the same 
weekday for the last month, 
• average market prices of the last 
week considering only business days, 
• average market prices of the last 
four months, 
• regression on the market prices of 
the last four months, and 
• regression on the market prices of 
the last five business days. 
 
They also use a feed-forward neural 
network trained with the historic 
market prices. It has  an  input  layer 
of eight units that includes the prices 
and powers of  the  same  period  of 
the previous day as well as the same 
weekdays of the previous  three 
weeks. The intermediate hidden layer 
has four  units  and  the  output has 
one unit—the predicted market price 
for the period in question. Figure 5 
shows the neural network  topology. 
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Market operation 
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Figure 5. Neural network used to forecast the market price for one period. This 
neural network has an input layer of eight units, an intermediate layer of four units, 
and one output unit—the predicted market price. 
show that they vary greatly from each 
other, which suggests that distinct 
algorithms can present distinct levels 
of results when dealing with such dif- 
ferent tendencies. 
The user can define the way the sta- 
tistics are updated and, consequently, 
the best answer chosen. MASCEM 
provides three reinforcement learning 
algorithms. All the algorithms start 
with the same value of confidence, 
which is then updated according to 
their particular  performance.  The 
user can also attribute a weight value 
to each that defines their  impor- 
tance to  the  system.  This means that 
a strategy that has a higher weight 
value will detach faster from the rest 
in case of either success or  failure. 
An adaptation of the  AMES  bid- 
ding strategy3 uses the Roth-Erev re- 
inforcement learning algorithm16 to 
choose the best among a set of pos- 
sible bids that are  calculated  based 
on the cost/profit relation that the 
player presents when producing elec- 
tricity. The various possible bids dif- 
fer from each other because of the 
distinct combination of input param- 
eters. The more combinations we set, 
the better chance we have of getting a 
good result. However, the number of 
combinations affects the processing 
time and the number of runs required 
for a satisfactory convergence. 
The composed-goal directed strategy 
is based on two consecutive objectives: 
the first is increasing the profit (reduc- 
ing the payoff), and the second is re- 
ducing the greenhouse effect emissions. 
This strategy will try to obtain the 
highest profit, decreasing the price if in 
the same period of the previous day the 
first objective was not completely satis- 
fied, and then try to  fulfill the   second 
The adapted derivative-following strat- 
egy adjusts its price by looking at the 
amount of revenue earned in the same 
period of the previous day as a result 
of that period’s price change. If that 
period’s price change produced more 
revenue per good than the same pe- 
riod of two days before, then the 
strategy makes a similar price change. 
If the previous change produced less 
revenue per good, then the strategy 
makes a different price change. 
The market-price-following strat- 
egy, as  the  name  suggests, follows 
the market price of  the  same period 
of the previous day. This simple strat- 
egy presents good results when prices 
show a tendency to stabilize for a cer- 
tain period. 
The main reinforcement algorithm 
presents a distinct set of statistics for 
each period, which means that an al- 
gorithm that is presenting good re- 
sults for a certain period, with its 
output chosen more often when bid- 
ding  for  this  period,  might  never be 
Our methods includes these three 
versions of reinforcement learning 
algorithms: 
 
• a simple reinforcement learning al- 
gorithm, for which we update the 
values using a direct decrement of 
the confidence value C in the time 
t, according to the absolute value of 
the difference between the predic- 
tion P and the real value R: Ct1 
Ct  |R  P|; 
• the revised Roth-Erev reinforce- 
ment learning algorithm, which in- 
cludes all the previous algorithm’s 
features and a weight value W that 
defines the importance of past ex- 
perience: Ct+1 = Ct W |R P| 
(1  W); and 
• a learning algorithm based on the 
Bayes theorem of probability,18,19 
for which we update the values by 
propagating the probability that 
each algorithm will be successful 
given its past performance: 
goal, while still satisfying the first. chosen as the answer for another   pe-  
The adapted derivative-following 
strategy is based on a derivative- 
following  strategy  proposed  by  Amy 
R. Greenwald and Jeffrey O. Kephart.17 
riod because the various periods are 
completely independent. The tenden- 
cies observed when looking at the his- 
tory of individual negotiation  periods 
   
 
where E is the available evidence, A is 
an action with possible outcomes Oi, 
Price of the 
previous day 
Power of the 
previous day 
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days before 
Power of seven 
days before 
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days before 
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days before 
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days before 
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price 
  
 
 
U(Oi | A) is the utility of each of the 
outcome states given  that  action A 
is taken, and P(Oi | E, A) is the con- 
ditional probability distribution over 
the possible outcome states, given 
that evidence E is observed and ac- 
tion  A taken. 
 
Experimental Findings 
To test our method, we generated 
three simulations for the same 14 con- 
secutive days, starting from Wednes- 
day, 29 October 2008. The data we 
used in this case study was based on 
real data from the Iberian market, ex- 
tracted from OMEL (www.omel.es). 
These simulations involve seven 
buyers and five sellers (three regular 
sellers and two  VPPs).  We created 
this group of agents to represent the 
real Spanish market, but we  reduced 
it to a smaller version that  contains 
the essential aspects of the market to 
allow a better individual analysis and 
study of the interactions and poten- 
tial of each  actors. 
In the first simulation, we consid- 
ered a different strategy for each agent. 
In the second and third simulations, 
all the strategies remained the same 
except for seller 2, which was our test 
subject. The first simulation used the 
neural network strategy for the bid 
definition. In the second, it used a sta- 
tistical approach, a regression on the 
data of the last five business days. Fi- 
nally, in the third simulation, it used 
our proposed strategy for bid defini- 
tion. The selected reinforcement learn- 
ing algorithm for this third simulation 
was the revised Roth-Erev, with equal 
value of the algorithm weights and a 
past-experience weight W value of 0.4. 
We used a small past-experience value 
to grant higher influence to the most 
recent results so that the algorithm 
could learn quickly and catch new ten- 
dencies in the changing market. 
After the simulations, we com- 
pared the profits obtained by seller   2 
using each strategy. Seller 2’s power 
supply remained constant at 550 MW 
for each period throughout the 
simulations. 
We defined the other  players’ bids 
as follows: 
 
• Buyer   1   bought   power   indepen- 
dently of the market price. (The of- 
fer price was 18.30 c€/kWh, which 
was much higher than average mar- 
ket price.) 
• Buyer  2’s  bid  price  varied  between 
two  fixed  prices,  depending  on  its 
need  to  buy.  (The  two  variations 
were 10.00 and 8.00 c€/kWh.) 
• Buyer 3’s bid price was fixed at 
4.90 c€/kWh. 
• Buyer 4’s bid considered the average 
prices of the last four Wednesdays. 
• Buyer 5’s bid considered the aver- 
age prices of the last four months. 
• Buyer 6 considered the average prices 
of the last week (considering only 
business days). 
• Buyer 7 only bought power if mar- 
ket prices were lower than average 
market price. 
• Seller    1    needed    to    sell    all    the 
power   that   it   produced.   (The   of- 
fer   price   was   0.00   c€/kWh.   The 
price  at  which  it  actually  sold  was 
the  market  price  returned  by  the 
market  operator  after  all  bids  were 
received.) 
• Seller 3’s bid considered the average 
prices  of  the  last  four  months  with 
an increment of 0.5 c€/kWh. 
• VPP   1   included   four   wind   farms 
and   offers   a   fixed   value   all   day. 
(The offer price was 3.50 c€/kWh.) 
• VPP 2 included one photovoltaic, 
one cogeneration, and one mini- 
hydro plants. Its offer price was 
based on the costs  of  cogenera- 
tion and on the total forecasted 
production. 
 
Because the reinforcement learn- 
ing  algorithm  treated  each  period of 
the  day  as  a  distinct  case,  we  had 
to analyze each period individually. 
Figure 6 presents the evolution of 
seller 2’s  profits  in  the  first  period 
of the day, over a period of 14 days. 
Figure 6a presents the results  from 
the first simulation, Figure 6b shows 
seller 2’s profits in the second simu- 
lation, and Figure 6c gives seller 2’s 
profits in the third simulation using 
our proposed method. 
Figure 6 shows that the third sim- 
ulation was clearly the most profit- 
able for seller 2. In the first day using 
the proposed strategy, the profit was 
below the value of the profit using the 
regression. That is because the con- 
fidence values for all the algorithms 
were initially equal so  the  selection 
of the answer is made by chance. The 
selected algorithm  answer originated 
a low profit. 
After the reinforcement learning 
algorithm was updated on the sec- 
ond day, it chose the strategy that got 
the best reward the first day. At that 
point and on the third day, its profit 
was above both the other comparison 
strategies. 
On the fourth day, its profit value 
was below the neural network results 
because the algorithm was still select- 
ing the algorithm that got the best re- 
sults in the first three days. 
On the fifth day, the value  was 
equal to the neural network. This 
trend continued until day 10, despite 
its lower values on days nine and 10. 
On day 11, the reinforcement learn- 
ing algorithm no longer chose the 
neural network because its value was 
higher than those of the other two 
strategies. 
In the last two days, the reinforce- 
ment learning algorithm selected the 
regression algorithm, catching  its 
high value tendency in time to get two 
good final results. This  was because 
of the low past-experience weight 
value;    otherwise    this    algorithm 
  
 
 
 
 
 
would have been chosen 
because of its weaker per- 
formance in the first days. 
(Further details about this 
case study are available at 
www.mascem.com.) 
These results show that 
our proposed method 
achieves better results 
than the individual strate- 
gies. We were able to catch 
the good result trends by 
reacting quickly to the de- 
creasing tendencies. This 
result demonstrates that 
we can combine several 
algorithms with distinct 
characteristics. Because 
we can combine all the al- 
gorithms and  they work 
in parallel, this system in 
fact becomes more intel- 
ligent as it learns, adapts, 
and makes the most of its 
environment. 
 
Because MASCEM 
can simulate many  types  
of  markets,  we  are 
using it in several classes to 
show students the differ- 
ences between each type 
of negotiation. We are also 
adding a simplified version 
of MASCEM to our web- 
site  (www.mascem.com) 
to  let  the Web community 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Seller 2’s profits in the first period of the day, over a 
period of 14 days. Three separate simulations used (a) the 
regression on the data of the last five business days, (b) a neural 
network, and (c) our proposed strategy for bid definition, 
respectively. 
and the Knowledge Engineer- 
ing and Decision Support 
Research Center (GECAD) 
unit for their support of this 
work. 
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